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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to document the history of the development of an Assault 
Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) Program as well as Navy Program Office 
(PMA272) efforts to date, to initiate a new start ACAT II Program for Navy and Marine 
Corps helicopters starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006.  It concentrates on the programmatic 
aspects of Assault DIRCM and does not go into detail on the design or technical aspects of 
the development of the system.  This thesis will introduce emerging threats to helicopters 
operating in theater and describe the requirement for a DIRCM technology.  It will also 
highlight program issues based on observations made over the past year as well as provide 
a recommended path forward for immediate program execution considering internal and 
external program and acquisition constraints both real and perceived.    
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PREFACE 
 
The information and technical data contained in this thesis are broadly based on actual 
program information pertaining to the Assault DIRCM Program.  Historical data are 
presented to the best of the author’s knowledge.  This thesis is UNCLASSIFIED and all 
data presented were accessed via public access in various publications, articles and on the 
world-wide-web.  This thesis is not and should not be construed as an endorsement for any 
company or product.   It merely studies current circumstances and provides one option of 
several as a means by which to move forward with an Assault DIRCM Program today.  
The findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein are the sole opinion of 
the author and may or may not represent the official position of PMA272, PEO(T), Naval 
Air Systems Command or the Department of the United States Navy. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
While addressing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell warned that “no threat is more serious to aviation” than man-portable air 
defense systems (MANPADS).1   Man portable shoulder-fired infrared (IR) guided 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or MANPADS have been the primary cause of combat 
losses of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft since the first Gulf War.  With the 
advancement of more sophisticated IR seekers, as depicted in Figure 1-1, comes the need 
for more advanced infrared countermeasures. 
 
 The recent urgency is highlighted by irrefutable evidence of the proliferation of 
these systems by terrorists and insurgents as they target helicopter operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Low altitude helicopter tactics make these platforms particularly vulnerable 
to MANPADS as newer generations of IR SAMs are showing improved immunity to 
existing onboard flares.  The requirement for a Directional Infrared Countermeasures 
(DIRCM) system is vital to the survivability of helicopters in today’s Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  The Department of the Navy (DoN) has recognized that helicopters 
currently have a greater need for this protection than tactical fixed wing jets and has 
directed funding, to start an Assault DIRCM Program for assault helicopters in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 06 with a Tactical DIRCM (TADIRCM), or commonly called, Strike DIRCM 
Program start in FY 08.    
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Figure 1-1.  Infrared (IR) Missile Generations 
Source: PMA272, Electronic Warfare Program Office Road Map Brief, June 2003 
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 In today’s acquisition environment it is imperative that joint requirements 
between the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) be considered to the 
maximum extent possible for a variety of reasons, but primarily to ensure affordability 
and interoperability is considered.  Based on the fact that there are a number of 
Department of Defense (DoD) programs already in development or production, in 2003, 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC), in an executive meeting, 
designated the Army as Lead Service for IRCM development for all DoD helicopter 
programs.2   Similarly, the Air Force was designated Lead Service for IRCM 
development on all DoD large transport fixed wing aircraft and the Navy was designated 
Lead Service for Strike or fighter aircraft.  It should be noted that this guidance directly 
affects any new start program(s) today. 
 
 The Program Manager for Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection Systems 
(ATAPS), PMA272, at Naval Air Systems Command is required to execute the Navy’s 
Assault DIRCM Program for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters under the Army’s 
existing IRCM development effort for Army helicopters.  Within the Department of the 
Army, the Project Manager Aviation Electronic Systems (PM, AES) manages a family of 
programs or a suite of electronic components namely the Suite of Integrated Infrared 
Countermeasures (SIIRCM), that address IR, radio frequency (RF), and laser-guided 
threats to protect helicopters and aircrew.   
 
 As part of SIIRCM, the Army is currently testing the AN/ALQ-212 Advanced 
Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM)/Common Missile Warning System 
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(CMWS) which provides passive IR guided missile warning and laser countermeasures 
and cues flare dispenser countermeasures to defeat current and future missile threats.   
The ATIRCM/CMWS Program has experienced a number of technical and programmatic 
challenges that make joining the program in the near term difficult for the Navy and 
Marine Corps. 
 This thesis will provide background information on the MANPADS threat 
evolution, countermeasures required, and existing programs available today.  It will also 
discuss program management challenges and constraints that have hindered program 
progress and provide several alternative options.    
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2.0 THE THREAT 
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are small, light-weight missile 
launching weapons designed to be fired from an operator on the ground at a target in the 
air.  They are commonly described as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles that are short 
range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can be carried and fired by a single individual 
or carried by several individuals and fired by two people acting as a crew.  Depending on 
which source is used, there are an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 missiles supporting over 
100,000 complete MANPADS systems, many thousands of which are estimated to be 
available on the black market making them easily accessible to terrorists and other 
insurgent groups.  MANPADS are particularly attractive to these groups because they are 
inexpensive, highly portable, easily concealable and extremely lethal particularly against 
helicopters and other low flying aircraft such as those operating in terminal areas.  
According to the Small Arms Survey 2004, Big Issue, Big Problem?, there are at least 13 
non-state groups in possession of MANPADS, most of which are considered terrorist 
organizations.   
 
MANPADS have been in existence for nearly 40 years but have recently been gaining 
attention in world news as terrorist groups are getting more proficient at using them and 
as more sophisticated systems are being developed.    Most MANPADS weapon systems 
consist of a rocket propelled guided missile packaged in a tube, a launching mechanism 
and a battery.  The tubes, which have an aiming device, protect the missile until it has 
been launched and are disposed.  Figure 2-1 depicts several examples of MANPADS 
being used in the field. 
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Figure 2-1.  Examples of MANPADS 
Source: Various Sources 
 
MANPADS missiles often use an on-board battery to power electronics of the 
weapon for guidance and often a cooling unit to cool the missile’s sensors.  Figure 2-2 
details the typical components of a MANPADS. 
 
 MANPADS systems typically range from about 4 feet to 6 ½ feet in length and about 
3 inches in diameter.  They normally weigh between 25 and 56 pounds making them very 
easy to transport and conceal. 
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Figure 2-2.  Main Components of a typical MANPADS 
Source: US Dept of State Fact Sheet, The MANPADS Menace 
 
There are three main types of MANPADS generally classified by their guidance 
systems or seekers.  Most missiles use an infrared (IR) guidance system which seeks a 
target by contrasting the heat signature from an aircraft’s engine or hot exhaust gases 
with the outside ambient temperature.  The vast majority of MANPADS available use 
these passive infrared seekers.  These missiles are sometimes called “fire and forget” 
missiles because the operator doesn’t have to guide the missile to its target.  It merely 
flies to the hottest source in its path.  A second commonly employed method uses 
operator guidance commands relayed to the missile via radio signal, somewhat similar to 
radio controlled airplanes.   This design requires the operator to visually aim at the target 
and manually guide the missile.   The former method is more common and a since it 
doesn’t emit energy from the launcher, is very difficult to detect and evade.  As these 
operators become more proficient however, the latter method may become more 
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detrimental because the missile can be guided to the target regardless of any 
countermeasures employed.  The third type of MANPADS available today employs a 
laser beam that guides the missile along the laser beam to the precise point that the beam 
is aimed.    This requires the operator to continuously track the target by keeping a laser 
beam pointed on it.   
 
MANPADS are becoming increasingly sophisticated offering greater range, greater 
flexibility, more accuracy in hitting the target and inflict greater damage.  Some of the 
newer generation MANPADS employ image seekers that lock on to UV or IR targets.  
Newer MANPADS can also engage targets at ranges of up to 6000 meters.  (Small Arms 
Report)  The combination of these improvements enables the operator to lock-on target at 
greater ranges from greater angles and have a greater chance of hitting aircraft. 
 
The US Military has recognized the increasing threat to its tactical and assault aircraft 
particularly from infrared guided missiles.  The lethality and proliferation of IR surface-
to-air missiles was demonstrated during the Desert Storm conflict.  Both IR SAMs and IR 
air-to-air missiles have seekers with improved counter countermeasures (CCM) 
capabilities that seriously degrade the effectiveness of current expendable decoys.   
 
MANPADS are the most serious threat to our large, low maneuverable and slow 
flying aircraft.  Notwithstanding small-arms-fire, MANPADS are also the greatest threat 
to US Military helicopters operating in theater. 
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  In the past two decades, infrared guided missiles have caused half of the total 
aircraft losses in theater.  The development and proliferation of advanced infrared-guided 
surface-to-air missiles, which have improved lethality and increasing immunity to flares 
are driving the requirement of infrared countermeasure systems.     
 
Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) are technologies used to protect 
aircraft from these advanced infrared-guided missiles.  Simply depicted in Figure 2-3, a 
DIRCM system confuses the infrared seeker in the nose cone of the missile, forcing it off 
course and missing its intended target.  An on-board DIRCM system first warns of an 
incoming IR missile and then hands off this information to a jammer.  The jammer uses 
an infrared tracker that follows the incoming missile and guides a laser beam to the IR 
seeker in the missile’s nose cone.  The system then transmits the appropriate jamming 
signals that forces the missile off track. 
 
Figure 2-3. Simplified DIRCM Solution 
Source: NGC CH-53E TAP Stakeholder’s Brief, October 2005 
 
SUSTAIN
BOOST
1. MWS: DETECT & DECLARE
MISS
JAM
2. IR JAMMER: HAND-OFF & SLEW
3. LASER: TRACK & JAM
EJECT
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3.0 EXISTING INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAMS 
There are a number of IR countermeasures systems that are currently in development 
or are already in production within the DoD that can potentially be leveraged from as a 
joint program for the Assault DIRCM Program.   
 
3.1 ARMY SUITE OF INTEGRATED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 
A Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures  (SIIRCM) includes the Army’s next 
generation lamp/laser jammer, coupled with the new missile warning system (MWS), an 
advanced flare dispenser, and an advanced flare munition.  The suite essentially consists 
of the AN/ALQ-212 Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM) (Increment 
2) and the AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (Increment 1) as 
depicted in Figure 3-1.   
 
The ATIRCM/CMWS suite design is modular to allow multiple configurations on a 
wide range of aircraft and other vehicles.  In January 1995, the Army ATIRCM/CMWS 
Program became a joint program as the Navy/Air Force Advanced Missile Warning 
System Program joined to leverage off of the CMWS part of the program.  The lead 
platforms were to be the MH-60K helicopter for the Army, the AV-8B jet aircraft for the 
Navy and the F-16 jet aircraft for the Air Force.  At its peak as a joint program in 1998, 
the total program cost was projected to be $3 billion.  Delays and cost increases plagued 
the ATIRCM/CMWS program and in 1999, the Army restructured the program to 
provide more time and money for serious developmental problems uncovered during 
CMWS testing.   
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Figure 3-1. Army ATIRCM/CMWS Components 
Source: PM, AES, ATIRCM/CMWS Brief, August 2004 
 
At the time, DoD investigated alternatives but decided to stay with ATIRCM/CMWS 
for Army aircraft.  However, the Air Force backed out of the program in 1999 shortly 
followed by the Navy.    After restructuring the program, the Army delayed the low-rate 
initial production decision to 2002 and the full rate production decision to 2003.  The 
system’s overall developmental costs had increased from $54 million to a projected $127 
million.3 
 
In addition to reported software challenges, as of April 2001, the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) was rating hardware issues and the system’s readiness for 
production of moderate risk, likely to result in unacceptable or marginal performance.4 
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The ATIRCM/CMWS program has been at risk of total cancellation since 2001.  In 
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 161, the DoD zeroed the AITRCM/CMWS line in the 
Fiscal Year 02 budget.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, however, 
reinstated funding with Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) 2.5   The Army still 
desperately needs improved IRCM protection for its helicopters as was painfully evident 
in the loss of aircraft during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in 2003 and 2004. 
 
Following cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Program in early 2004 
the Army has increased funding for survivability improvements for its existing helicopter 
fleet.6   In December 2004, as presented to PMA272, the ATIRCM/CMWS Roadmap 
showed an ATIRCM Full Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) in Fiscal Year 06 
as depicted in Figure 3-2.   
 
In March 2005, the Government Accounting Agency (GAO) released an assessment 
of selected major weapons programs in Defense Acquisitions.7   In this report the GAO 
assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800 billion, most of which 
are costing more and taking longer to develop than planned.  The report briefly discussed 
ATIRCM/CMWS Program technology maturity, design stability and production maturity.  
The GAO and the Army both confirmed in the report that initial operational tests and 
evaluation will be completed during Fiscal Year 05 for CMWS and in the Fiscal Year 06 
for ATIRCM.  The full-rate production decision review (FRPDR) for the complete 
system is officially scheduled for 2006 but it rumored to be slipping again. 
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Figure 3-2. Army ATRICM/CMWS Roadmap 
Source: PM, AES (PEO IEW&S) 
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3.2 LARGE AIRCRAFT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 
Large Aircraft Directed IR Countermeasures (LAIRCM) is an Air Force managed 
program for large tanker and transport aircraft to improve the capability against 
MANPADS.  LAIRCM is optimized for large aircraft, which present a large IR heat 
source (in both surface area and intensity) for incoming missiles.  A higher powered laser 
and a greater range missile warner is required, which is not suitable for smaller fixed 
wing aircraft and helicopters.  LAIRCM is currently in production and is planned for the  
Air Force C-17, C-130, KC-135, and KC-10 aircraft.  LAIRCM is also one of three 
candidates being considered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to protect 
airliners from terrorist missiles.     
 
3.3 DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 
The Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) system is a variant of the 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) LAIRCM system.  ‘DIRCM’ is the term 
commonly used for the NGC Nemesis (UK name) variant.   Figure 3-3 depicts the family 
of NGC infrared countermeasures.  In 1989, under Operational Emergency Requirement 
(OER) 3/89, the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) began funding infrared countermeasure 
research, with the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) joining the project in 
1993.8   The Army’s ATIRCM/CMWS suite was far from production ready and in March 
1999, the NGC DIRCM was selected by the UK MoD and SOCOM for their fixed wing 
and helicopter fleets.  DIRCM testing began in October 1997 and was completed in 
January 2001.  SOCOM has now picked DIRCM for the CV-22 aircraft and the MH-53 
helicopters. 
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Figure 3-3. NGC Family of DIRCMs 
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation 
 
3.4 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 
 The US Navy’s Tactical Aircraft Directed Infrared Countermeasures (TADIRCM) 
program is researching the feasibility of a deployable IR laser countermeasures capability 
aboard tactical fixed wing aircraft.  TADIRCM is an Advanced Technology (ATD) 
program directed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).  It is a low profile, laser-
based infrared (IR) countermeasure system designed to protect fixed wing aircraft from 
both today’s and tomorrow’s surface to air and air-to-air IR guided missile threats.  
TADIRCM consists of an infrared missile warning system (MWS) and a directed 
countermeasure system (DIRCM) intended to be operationally deployed on tactical jet 
aircraft, specifically the Navy’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. 
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 The TADIRCM program is currently a concept demonstration effort managed by 
PMA272 at Naval Air Systems Command.   The goal of the program is to develop and 
demonstrate missile warning, pointing/tracking and directed IR jammer technologies that 
can meet the needs of tactical fixed wing aircraft.  Requirements for tactical jet aircraft 
exceed the requirements for helicopters primarily because of the different operating 
environments to which they deploy.  One such example is a considerably smaller, more 
aerodynamic jam head for the laser jammer needs to be utilized, much smaller than the 
ATIRCM or  DIRCM jam heads intended for helicopters and large transports.  Another 
example is TADIRCM requires an IR staring sensor that has a longer range and better 
clutter rejection and operates at different wavelengths to minimize false alarms.  
TADIRCM is being developed as a podded system. 
 
 An Early Operational Assessment (EOA) is currently underway to further 
advance the technology and act as a risk reduction effort.  TADIRCM will result in a 
Strike DIRCM Program currently budgeted as a Fiscal Year 08 program start.   
 
3.5 ASSAULT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 
Following JROC guidance, the Navy submitted a budget proposal for Assault 
DIRCM based on joining the Army’s ATIRCM Program.  In 2004, the Navy received FY 
06 funding for a new start ACAT II Program namely an ATIRCM Increment 3 based on 
the notional evolutionary acquisition roadmap depicted in Figure 3-4.  It should be noted 
that this figure is identical to Figure 3-2 with Increment 3 highlighted as being a Navy-  
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Figure 3-4. ATIRCM/CMWS Increment 3.  
Source: PMA272 and PM, AES Joint Brief, October 2004 
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contract efforts.  The contract would be Cost Plus Incentive Fee, sole source to BAE.  Per 
the approved Army Acquisition Strategy already in place, BAE would compete 
component upgrades as directed. 
 
Considering capability requirements (future threats) annotated in the draft 
Capabilities Definition Document (CDD) and with Navy legacy aircraft and different 
existing systems, there was only one common component available in Increment 2 that 
the Navy could feasibly leverage from.  The Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) was the only 
common funding requirement that was to be developed.  All other components would 
have to be developed to accommodate current Navy aircraft configurations and future 
capabilities requirements.  A notional developmental Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) 
component diagram is depicted in Figure 3-5. 
 
The Navy worked with Army to comply with JROC guidance as a cooperative 
program for ATIRCM Increment 3.  A concurrent Army Increment 2 Full Rate 
Production Decision Review (FRPDR) with a Navy led Increment 3 Milestone B was 
planned with the Army Acquisition Executive staff.  A Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) and a Charter between PMA272 and PM, AES was drafted and the Navy 
Requirements Officer, N-78, drafted a CDD with the Army in 2004.  
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Figure 3-5. Notional Increment 3 Development NRE 
Source: PMA272 
 
In August 2004, progress between PM, AES (the Army ATIRCM PM) and PMA272 
slowed.  The CDD, MOA and Charter remained in a draft status and a Joint Acquisition 
Strategy had yet to be worked.  The PM, AES cited technical problems with 
ATIRCM/CMWS testing as well as a lack of resources as the cause for the inability to 
work Increment 3 with the Navy.  Rightfully so, the Army had current problems that 
needed immediate attention and focus.  Army said a delay of at least until June 05 was 
inevitable.  This meant at least a six-month delay for the Navy effort.  As of November 1, 
2005, no progress has been made to propel a joint ATIRCM/CMWS Increment 3.  
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3.6 CH-53E TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PROJECT 
FY 05 Supplemental funding was received in July 2005 to provide for the 
procurement and testing of a Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) for the CH-
53E Helicopter, proven capability currently employed on SOCOM’s MH-53J.  PMA261, 
the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter Program Office, requested assistance from PMA272 in 
the execution of this effort.  PMA272 agreed to execute the effort as a Technology 
Assessment Project (TAP) to assess the improved survivability of a DIRCM system as 
compared with currently installed aircraft survivability equipment (ASE).   
 
A competitive award was given via CECOM’s Rapid Response (R2) Program Office 
to Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) on September 29, 2005.  It is a one-year effort 
where the NGC will temporarily install a DIRCM system for evaluation of improved 
survivability over the currently installed ASE equipment.  This project currently does not 
have funding for fleet introduction. 
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4.0 ANALYSIS 
Limiting the scope of the thesis, keeping it unclassified, protecting DoD information 
and protecting contractor proprietary information made it difficult to adequately define 
all the issues in this thesis.  Program Office resources were used which included the 
author’s program briefs, DoD program information, as well as data from four prime 
contractor data packages. To ensure information was protected, all information included 
herein, was verified via public access venues.  Additionally, a literature review was 
conducted by both the author and the Patuxent River Technical Library.  Selected results 
of the literature review are included in the bibliography.   
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5.0 DISCUSSION 
For a variety of technical reasons, the Navy’s effort at joining the Army’s 
ATIRCM/CMWS program has virtually come to a stall.  Problems with 
ATIRCM/CMWS are well known but how the Army PM will ultimately mitigate these 
problems has not been publicized to date.  One potential solution prevents the Navy from 
spiraling in with the Army development until FY 09, which is unacceptable to the Navy.  
It is clearly evident that Navy cannot execute a program in FY 06 with the Army, 
therefore other program options have been looked at and a final recommendation is 
presented here.  Program cost estimates were completed and used to support the final 
program recommendation.  Due to the proprietary nature of the data, the cost estimates 
are not included in this thesis.  Estimates were derived based on program office 
experience and actual costs from the LAIRCM, ATIRCM/CMWS and TADIRCM 
programs were used as well as contractor estimates based on projected sales.  Estimates 
were based on FY06 dollars and there were no adjustments made for inflation.  Team 
estimates, engineering and logistics, and test and evaluation costs were rolled up into one 
sheet.  Representative results of the rolled up estimate for the recommended strategy are 
included in Appendix A. 
 
Affordability and total life cycle costs for each option were also developed and used 
as a tool to validate the final recommendation.  Estimates derived and presented here 
have not been validated and a complete cost analysis by cost estimators has not been 
done.  The results have not been approved by PMA272. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The Department of the Navy 2005 Electronic Warfare Operational Advisory Group 
(OAG) listed Assault DIRCM Initial Operational Capability (IOC) as a top priority for 
FY08.  The Navy has funding and a budget starting in FY06 for an Assault DIRCM 
Program.  Based on Joint Requirement Oversight Committee (JROC) guidance, the Army 
is the designated lead for all DoD helicopter IRCM programs.  The Army is experiencing 
continual technical and programmatic difficulties on the ATIRCM/CMWS program and 
there is a potential for the Full Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) to slip to the 
right as far as Fiscal Year 09.  Bottom line; ATIRCM/CMWS is not production ready and 
does not meet the urgent needs of the Navy. 
 
Team estimates have indicated that staying the course with ATIRCM/CMWS will not 
only put Navy’s FY 06 and FY 07 funding in jeopardy but will incur excessive 
developmental as well as O&S costs and, more significantly, will push the IOC for the 
‘lead the fleet’ aircraft out as far as 2015.   Additionally, if the Army does not outfit their 
entire helicopter fleet with complete ATIRCM systems, procuring ‘big lots’ with the 
Army may not present a great savings as once anticipated.     
 
If the DoN wants DIRCM capability on Navy and Marine Corps helicopters in the 
near future, ATIRCM/CMWS is not a viable option. 
 
There is only one currently available DIRCM system on the market today that has the 
ability to meet the immediate needs of the Navy and the ability to meet future 
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requirements such as future IR threats expected to be proliferated beyond 2015.   The 
NGC DIRCM does not meet all the draft Capabilities Definition Document (CDD) 
requirements today but provides the opportunity to incrementally meet those capabilities.  
LAIRCM, a direct relative of DIRCM, is planning incremental developments that will 
directly benefit DIRCM improvements.  Additionally, a number of Navy helicopter 
program offices do not support waiting until 2015 for a DIRCM capability and will likely 
procure systems on their own if PMA272 doesn’t develop a common system for all DoN 
helicopters in the near term.  Procuring DIRCM initially as an Off-The-Shelf (OTS) 
system and incrementally developing capabilities not only meets the intent of a joint 
program (with the Air Force), it increases commonality and thereby reduces overall life 
cycle costs to the Navy and Marine Corps platforms. 
 
SOCOM is planning to procure and maintain their DIRCM systems on their fixed 
wing and helicopters via the Air Force LAIRCM Program starting in 2007.   LAIRCM is 
investing millions of dollars to advance DIRCM capabilities that will also be available to 
SOCOM aircraft.  The Air Force and SOCOM are planning to outfit over 1000 aircraft 
with a complete NGC DIRCM system.  If Navy joins the Air Force and procures the 
DIRCM system, it will benefit from LAIRCM’s technological investments.  Additionally, 
economy of scale is expected to reduce the costs of a complete system by 40% within the 
next 10 years. 
 
In conclusion, considering the current needs of the Navy and Marine Corps Fleet as 
well as current technology and life cycle costs, the Navy should consider breaking away 
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from the Army and join the Air Force under the LAIRCM program to install NRE 
DIRCM systems on our helicopters as depicted in Figure 6-1. This option would allow 
Navy to procure and deliver much needed DIRCM technology to assault helicopters now 
and it would also provide for future upgrade capability as future threats emerge. 
 
  
 
Figure 6-1. NDI Option for Assault DIRCM 
Source: Author 
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided based on the author’s observations and 
lessons learned while assigned as the Assault DIRCM IPT Lead. 
a) First and foremost, it is imperative that program requirements be defined.  It is 
impossible to formulate a strategy for a system development acquisition program 
with moving requirements.  Once capability requirements are defined and 
approved (CDD approved), then a program manager can expect to develop a 
program to meet those requirements. 
b) If JROC or DoD direction requires joint participation on a program or assigns a 
lead service for a developmental effort, responsibility for that effort needs to be 
placed on the lead service.  An example of holding the lead service accountable 
might be to make joint participation an entrance criteria for a milestone decision.  
In other words, as an example, since Navy is designate the lead service for tactical 
jet aircraft IRCM development, then the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
should ask the question “What have you done to incorporate the other service’s 
requirements into the program?  Where is the join application on the program?”  
If the answer is not adequate, and verifiable, then the MDA should not approve 
the Milestone Decision.  This would put the onus on the lead service to take the 
lead. 
c) A total systems engineering approach must be applied to the development of an 
Assault DIRCM Program.  Currently, there is no design philosophy for common 
self-protection systems.  Instead of ‘buying boxes’ and acting as an integrator, we 
need to apply sound systems engineering processes to include open architecture 
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and a total design philosophy so that our systems are compatible on all of our 
aircraft as well as compatible with each other. 
d) Initially, when efforts were underway to work on a spiral upgrade to the 
ATIRCM/CMWS Program, a developmental Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) 
slide was used for all briefings that drove the solution to the problem (Figure 3-5).  
By using this slide and this fundamental way of thinking, we were defining the 
requirements with existing hardware and driving the solution to undefined 
requirements and therefore a particular contractor.  A key example is the 
assumption on the part of many that 2-color IR sensors are the only answer for a 
MWS to counter future threats.  If we present functional requirements, we might 
very well find that 2-color technology is not the only solution.   It is 
recommended that a functional design, as depicted in Figure 7-1 be used so as not 
to drive the solution to components.   
e) DIRCM system sensors for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters should be 
designed with an AAR-47 sensor form-fit-factor to the maximum extent possible.  
This will enable easy airframe integration and prevent major structural 
modification for a new sensor.  It will significantly reduce overall cost to the 
helicopter platforms. 
f) A DIRCM system design should incorporate robust integration with the ALE-47 
flare dispensing system.  It should not be assumed that DIRCM will be the only 
countermeasure installed on the aircraft.     
g) And finally, an important consideration when developing a DIRCM system for 
Navy Assault Helicopters is Open Architecture.  An open architecture is an  
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Figure 7-1. Assault DIRCM Functional Architecture 
Source: PMA272 Assault DIRCM IPT 
 
h) architecture wherein specifications are public.  This allows for the sharing of 
functionality to integrate hardware, software and/or operating environments.  The 
great advantage of open architectures is that anyone can design add-on products  
for it.  An open standards operating system must be used in all new Navy systems 
to ensure future system interoperability and to support software reuse.   
Open architecture: 
- accommodates evolving requirements and technology 
- realizes efficiencies as a common operating system 
- reduces and consolidates independent functions of legacy and future 
applications 
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- allows for the control of the migration of as-is architecture transitioning to 
to-be architecture 
- permits interoperability and net centric warfare and 
- reduces overall cost of developing new operating systems. 
 
There are some factors that need to be considered when applying open 
architecture to the development of DIRCM.  Commonality, interoperability, 
security (anti-tamper requirements), migration of legacy platforms, etc., all must 
be considered during the design process. 
 
In order for us to design to open architecture philosophy, we must make several 
assumptions.  First and foremost, capability definition must be defined and not 
changed during the design and implementation phase.  It must be assumed that 
open architecture design of a DIRCM system will not impact individual aircraft 
software.  It cannot be proprietary.  Existing software is not conducive to open 
architecture.  And system documentation needs to be thorough and complete and 
allow for anyone to use it. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Representative IPT Lead Roll-up Estimate for NDI Option for Assault DIRCM Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 Total
Team Estimate 1,837.25 2,074.00 3,113.50 3,756.50 3,761.50 3,444.50 2,796.00 2,017.25 1,982.25 24,782.75
Engineering & Logistics 3,700.00 25,500.00 56,500.00 22,900.00 5,050.00 3,050.00 1,150.00 100.00 100.00 117,150.00
T&E 4,220.00 1,780.00 3,420.00 380.00 800.00 10,570.00
TOTAL 5,537.25 27,574.00 63,833.50 28,436.50 12,231.50 6,874.50 4,746.00 2,117.25 2,082.25 152,502.75
Assumptions:
1.  All estimates are using a FY06 dollar basis (no adjustments for inflation).
2.  Lead platform is an MH-60 Multi-Mission Helicopter.
3.  This option assumes a Navy led program and modification of an existing system.
4.  Includes LW integration w/MW sensor.
5.  Some repackaging of the Jammer is required.
6.  Will use house-keeping software (BIT, Interface control, etc.) with little to no change.
7.  SDD contract award in FY07.
8.  Fabrication and GFE costs include spares quantities for test program.
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